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ToPIcAL SURVEY
FIFTH INTERNATIONAL TIN AGREEMENT
The Fifth International Tin Agreement (ITA) is a continua-
tion of a trade arrangement between international producers and
consumers of tin that attempts to control "excessive fluctuations"
in both the price and the supply of tin. The administrator of
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the ITA, the International Tin Council, is composed of all the
participating countries, both producers and consumers, which are
represented by one delegate each. Every delegate has a prescribed
number of votes that is determined by the proportion of the
amount of tin produced or consumed by the delegate's country
compared to the total amount of tin produced or consumed by
the respective group of participating members. The producing
and consuming countries both distribute 1,000 votes among them-
selves and thus have equal representation on the Council. Malay-
sia is the leading tin producer with 426 votes and the U.S. is the
leading tin consumer with 259 votes.
The principal means by which the Council controls the
market is by implementation of its "buffer stock" to which every
producing nation is required to contribute either tin or cash.
The consuming nations are invited to make contributions to the
buffer stock, but are not required to do so. A new clause in the
Fifth ITA provides for review of this provision by the Council
in 2 years; the implication being that if consuming nations do
not sufficiently contribute to the buffer stock they eventually
may be obligated to do so.
The ITA allows the Council to determine international
"floor and ceiling prices" for tin. Barring any changes by the
Council, the Fifth ITA provides that this price range shall re-
main as it was established by the Fourth ITA. The price range
is divided into three areas: upper, middle and lower. The market
price is allowed to fluctuate without interference in the middle
range. However, if the price of tin reaches into the upper range,
the manager of the buffer stock is obliged to "operate" on the
market in such a way that he is a "net seller" of tin, thus affecting
a decrease in the market price of tin. Conversely, if the price
drops into the lower range, the manager is to become a "net
buyer" of tin to raise the market price.
The Council also has the power to limit the quantity of tin
which may be exported from the producing countries if the world
supply of tin exceeds demand. It may impose penalties upon
violators of these export controls. Conversely, in the event of
a tin shortage, the Council can immediately terminate any export
controls and assist producing countries to increase their supplies.
The ITA becomes effective on July 1, 1976, provided that by
that date at least six producing countries with a minimum of
300 votes have ratified the agreement.
